No Accountability

It's not being bearish, it’s just journalism.

I honestly don’t know where Bitcoin is going from here.

It could be substantially higher a year from now. It could be substantially lower. It could spend the next five years frustrating both the bulls and the bears. I’ve learned over the years that making precise price predictions about speculative assets is a fool’s errand, and I’m not interested in pretending otherwise.

This article isn’t a referendum on Bitcoin, Ethereum, or digital assets generally. It’s also not an attempt to settle the endless debate between Michael Saylor and Peter Schiff. It’s about accountability, and whether financial media has any obligation to revisit the narratives it spends years enthusiastically promoting once those narratives begin to crack.

That question came to mind yesterday after Peter Schiff posted a tweet criticizing CNBC’s coverage of the recent collapse in Strategy-related securities and weakness in Bitcoin. Schiff wrote:

“Given how much airtime CNBC gave @Saylor to shill his MSTR 0.00%↑ house of cards, they are barely devoting any airtime to its current collapse…”

It’s one thing to never have Schiff on your network. That’s fine. But Schiff is right: this story is too big to not be covering. In the last 12 months, Strategy is down about -78%:. The scales are leaning slightly more towards “Schiff was right” than “Strategy is poised for a comeback” at this point, if you ask me.

I’m a realist, though, and I’m sure many people dismissed the Tweet yesterday because it came from Schiff. After all, he’s been one of Bitcoin’s most vocal critics for more than a decade. If you’ve followed financial markets for any length of time, you’ve heard someone say “Schiff has been calling for Bitcoin to collapse forever.” Fair enough. That’s true.

But it’s also worth remembering that Schiff was among those publicly questioning Alex Mashinsky and crypto firm Celsius before its collapse. Eight months before the firm blew up, on Kitco, Schiff criticized the platform’s unusually high yield promises, warning that such returns were often a red flag in the crypto industry and could signal underlying insolvency or mismanagement. He argued that Celsius was taking excessive risks with customer funds and questioned the transparency of its operations, suggesting that investors might not fully understand how their assets were being used.

And that’s why, in April, with Strategy’s STRC preferred product still trading at its $100 par price, I pointed out to my readers that it probably wasn’t a bad idea to listen to Schiff’s criticism of the product and take its 11.5% yield with a grain of salt.

“When you’re telling people to put their savings into this for income, that’s a huge red flag,” Schiff argued earlier this year. Now, STRC is trading at a $73 handle, representing a more than 20% loss of principle for people who bought then — a hole that would take years of collecting dividends to make up for. Some crypto commentators believe that STRC will never trade at par again and that “the damage has been done”.

And so you don’t have to agree with Schiff’s long-term conclusions on Bitcoin to acknowledge that he has occasionally identified serious problems before the broader market was willing to confront them. More importantly, history is full of people who sounded repetitive until they were suddenly proven right about something else entirely.

Madoff’s whistleblowers were ignored. The skeptics of Enron weren’t exactly invited onto television every week while the stock was climbing. Analysts warning about subprime mortgages in 2006 and early 2007 were mocked for “missing the new paradigm.” Critics of the SPAC boom were dismissed as people who simply didn’t understand innovation. Looking back, their warnings seem prescient. Living through them, however, they simply sounded like broken records.

That’s why I don’t think Schiff himself is the story here. His tweet merely raises a question that deserves a much broader discussion: what responsibility does financial television have after it spends years giving a platform to the same handful of market evangelists and those guests are imploding and taking viewer and investor capital with them?

Think about the amount of airtime Michael Saylor has received over the past several years. It seemed like every new Bitcoin purchase became an interview. Every convertible debt offering became another segment. Every financing announcement was treated as an opportunity to explain why borrowing billions of dollars to buy more Bitcoin was a revolutionary corporate strategy.

Likewise, Tom Lee has become one of CNBC’s most frequent market commentators, not only discussing equities but increasingly making the case for Ethereum and digital assets. Whether you agree with either man is beside the point. The point is that viewers have been exposed to these bullish narratives constantly.

And there’s nothing inherently wrong with that. Bullish guests deserve airtime. Bears deserve airtime too. Markets function because different people have different opinions. But journalism doesn’t end once the interview is over. If a network is willing to devote hundreds of hours to amplifying a thesis during the ascent, shouldn’t it devote at least some meaningful coverage to evaluating that thesis when things begin going the other direction?

Like, for example, how some sources estimate that between Saylor and Lee, they have over $20 billion in losses on their respective crypto investments. And how Lee’s BMNR is down about 58% year to date.

The media imbalance becomes even more glaring when you look at products like Strategy’s STRC preferred shares. When the offering was launched, the messaging wasn’t that this was some wildly speculative instrument appropriate only for aggressive traders. Quite the opposite. It was discussed as a safe yield-oriented security designed to broaden Strategy’s investor base and appeal to investors looking for income.

One video from Michael Saylor’s Twitter account shows a woman, retired on what appears to be a tropical island. Someone asks her if she’s on vacation while serving her a cocktail. She responds:

“I’m retired. I just don’t think I was meant to live an uncomfortable life. I worked hard as an engineer to save money, then I put my savings into STRC…”

Saylor’s text above the video says “You weren’t meant to live an uncomfortable life.” Below the video, Schiff had Tweeted in response:

I think this ad is deceptive and leaves Strategy open to lawsuits from investors who lose money. I don’t think the small print at the end will offset the deliberate intent of the ad that preceded it.

CNBC covered the launch of STRC and gave Saylor TV time to make his case for it, as did virtually every major financial publication.

“If Bitcoin’s up 2% a year, we can pay those dividends forever,” Saylor said a couple months ago on CNBC. He wasn’t asked directly what would happen in bitcoin went down for a prolonged period of time.

And today on STRC, shares trade dramatically below their $100 par value, falling to about $73 this morning in the pre-market session. Investors who bought near issuance are down more than 20% on principal alone, meaning it could take roughly two years of those attractive dividend payments just to recover the capital loss, assuming nothing else changes.

Which makes me ask: how is that also not a major financial news story?

Imagine if a preferred security issued by a regional bank had been aggressively marketed, only to lose more than one-fifth of its value within months. Imagine if a dividend-focused REIT had produced that outcome shortly after management completed a nationwide media tour. Financial TV would almost certainly have panels discussing what went wrong, analysts debating whether investors had underestimated the risks, and anchors asking executives difficult follow-up questions. Yet when the same thing happens in the crypto ecosystem, the conversation seems subdued compared to the enthusiasm that surrounded the launch.

Nor is this phenomenon unique to crypto.

Take Cathie Wood, for example, who I have written about extensively. She gets tons of CNBC time since getting her Tesla investment “right” around 2020. By 2024, Morningstar estimated that ARK had destroyed approximately $14 billion in investor capital. They listed her as one of the top 15 funds that have destroyed the most wealth over the past decade. The CNBC appearances, however, have not stopped.

$14 billion is the kind of number that should invite some uncomfortable questions. Instead, the broader narrative around Wood has remained oddly charitable, as though the earlier success still carries more weight than the subsequent reality. Here she is getting 10 minutes on CNBC a couple months ago. A month before that, in March, she got another 10 minutes with Tom Lee. To start the year she was asked about her predictions for 2026 in another 6 minute look interview.

Wood is currently clinging to a 2024 analysis of Tesla that predicts shares could go to $2,600 by 2029. They are currently at about $350, down from recent highs over $400. She has missed a ton of operational targets and price targets on the name since her 2020 jump to fame. Since January 1, 2019, her flagship fund has underperformed the NASDAQ by about -259%. And this includes her Tesla run up where she was thrashing her benchmark by more than 100% at one point!

Since January 1, 2021, ARKK is down -38% while the NASDAQ is up 128%.

I discussed more about Wood during my recent interview with Adam Taggart here.

Despite all of this, Wood remains one of television’s favorite guests, regularly invited back to explain why the next disruptive innovation is just around the corner. Again, she has every right to make her case. My question is why the media rarely spends equal time examining the cost to the investors who followed it.

I estimate that between Michael Saylor, Tom Lee and Cathie Wood, there has been over 100 total appearances on CNBC over the last two years.

Now we’re watching what feels like the next chapter with the relentless promotion of SpaceX’s valuation. Cathie Wood is buying it, of course. And hey, maybe SpaceX ultimately becomes one of the greatest investments of this generation. It’s certainly one of the world’s most impressive companies. But I’d love to know how many people appearing on financial television to tout the opportunity already own shares, work for firms with exposure, or otherwise stand to benefit from continued enthusiasm.

Conversely, how many guests are invited simply to explain why investors should be cautious? How many independent skeptics are asked whether today’s private-market valuations make sense? Those voices seem remarkably difficult to find.

This is where the issue shifts from just Bitcoin to financial journalism.

Financial television does not have to predict market tops. Nobody can do that consistently. It doesn’t need to become bearish every time prices fall, nor should it refuse to interview people with optimistic outlooks. But it should have an obligation to revisit those optimistic narratives with some gusto after investors have experienced meaningful losses. If an executive spends months explaining why a strategy is revolutionary, that executive should also be invited back to explain why shareholders are down billions of dollars when circumstances change. If serious allegations of wrongdoing are leveled at a multi-billion dollar company and CNBC gets a chance to interview the CEO on live television, why not ask some pointed questions more than once?

Otherwise, what exactly is financial journalism accomplishing?

Too often it begins to resemble marketing. Bull markets create charismatic personalities. Those personalities attract viewers. Viewers generate ratings. Ratings sell advertising. Everyone benefits while prices are climbing. When prices reverse, however, the cameras simply move to the next exciting story. There is very little institutional memory. Few difficult follow-up interviews. Almost no serious discussion of whether the original thesis was incomplete, overly optimistic, or simply wrong.

That’s particularly unfortunate because ordinary investors absolutely notice this pattern. They notice which guests appear repeatedly during speculative booms. They notice that the skeptical voices often receive a fraction of the exposure. And they certainly notice when the enthusiasm disappears much faster than the accountability once prices begin falling.

Ironically, I don’t lose much sleep over it. If anything, it probably helps independent writers like me. Every time financial television fails to ask the questions viewers are asking themselves, more people begin searching for alternative sources of analysis. That’s probably good for my subscriber count. It’s why I started a podcast and a blog to begin with.

But let’s not pretend investors don’t see what’s happening. They’re smarter than the industry often gives them credit for. They understand that nobody can predict markets perfectly. They’re perfectly willing to forgive a bad call. What they’re less willing to forgive is the appearance that financial media is eager to amplify bullish narratives during the boom but reluctant to scrutinize those same narratives after billions of dollars have evaporated.

That’s ultimately why Schiff’s tweet resonated with me yesterday. Not because I suddenly agree with his outlook on Bitcoin. Not because I think Michael Saylor or Tom Lee shouldn’t be interviewed. And certainly not because I think CNBC should root against innovation or speculative assets all the time. It resonated because it asked a question that applies far beyond crypto: if financial television is going to enthusiastically hand out microphones on the way up, shouldn’t it be equally eager to ask hard questions on the way down?

That isn’t being bearish, it’s just journalism.

QTR’s Disclaimer: Please read my full legal disclaimer on my About page here. This post represents my opinions only. In addition, please understand I am an idiot and often get things wrong and lose money. I may own or transact in any names mentioned in this piece at any time without warning. Contributor posts and aggregated posts have been hand selected by me, have not been fact checked and are the opinions of their authors. They are either submitted to QTR by their author, reprinted under a Creative Commons license with my best effort to uphold what the license asks, or with the permission of the author.

This is not a recommendation to buy or sell any stocks or securities, just my opinions. I often lose money on positions I trade/invest in. I may add any name mentioned in this article and sell any name mentioned in this piece at any time, without further warning. None of this is a solicitation to buy or sell securities. I may or may not own names I write about and are watching. Sometimes I’m bullish without owning things, sometimes I’m bearish and do own things. Just assume my positions could be exactly the opposite of what you think they are just in case. If I’m long I could quickly be short and vice versa. I won’t update my positions.

As of May 20, 2026 I personally no longer actively trade (read my story here). My investing/saving is done by recurring contributions mostly to sector ETFs and a few select equities, trusted third parties who oversee my accounts, and advisors. Such advisors or funds, through individual equities, options, index funds, mutual funds, ETFs, or other securities, may have positions in, exposure to, or holdings of names mentioned herein that I know nothing about. Basically, via index funds, ETFs and individual equities it is possible I could own, have exposure to, or not own anything at any point. As of the same date, May 20, 2026, in an attempt to lead a healthier lifestyle, I’ve also excluded myself from fantasy sports, sports betting, online and in-person casinos and prediction markets.

And all positions can change immediately as soon as I publish this, with or without notice and at any point I can be long, short or neutral on any position. You are on your own. Do not make decisions based on my blog. I exist on the fringe. If you see numbers and calculations of any sort, assume they are wrong and double check them. I failed Algebra in 8th grade and topped off my high school math accolades by getting a D- in remedial Calculus my senior year, before becoming an English major in college so I could bullshit my way through things easier.

The publisher does not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of the information provided in this page. These are not the opinions of any of my employers, partners, or associates. I did my best to be honest about my disclosures but can’t guarantee I am right; I write these posts after a couple beers sometimes. I edit after my posts are published because I’m impatient and lazy, so if you see a typo, check back in a half hour. Also, I just straight up get shit wrong a lot. I mention it twice because it’s that important.